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I. Introduction 
 
Historically, return migration to the country of origin is seen as one out of three durable solutions to 
protracted refugee and displacement crises, next to resettlement to a third country and local 
integration in the country of stay1. In light of the mobility challenges posed by our ever changing and 
increasingly degrading environment, we might have to reconsider return migration as a durable 
solution for environmentally-induced migrants and displaced persons2. Furthermore, considering the 
increasingly strict migration policies of many destination countries, a greater proportion of return 
migration is now involuntary, invoking questions concerning the need for international protection of 
environmentally-displaced persons. 
Within this changing migration context, this paper seeks to discuss both voluntary as well as 
involuntary return migration in relation to environment-induced mobility. Before getting more into 
detail, the paper first conceptualises return migration within the general migration debate (1.1). The 
right to freedom of movement then provides the starting point for the further analysis, including the 
right for any person to leave a country, as well as the right to return to his or her own country (1.2). 
While it is often advocated that people living in a degrading environment should have a “right to 
leave” and a “right to stay”3, these assumptions surely deserve more legal academic attention, 
discussing how we could guarantee these rights in a warming world. 
As return migration can obviously only be a durable solution if it contributes to the socio-economic 
re-establishment of the returnee in his country of origin, Chapter II analyses how return migration 
could act as a durable development and adaptation strategy for environment-induced migrants and 
their communities of origin. Secondly, this paper explores the role of human rights if returning to a 
destructed environment becomes a duty rather than a choice, analysing non-refoulement obligations 
in the context of deteriorating living conditions (Chapter III). 
 
                                                           
1
 According to the UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is one out of 3 durable solutions (next to local integration in 
the country of asylum and resettlement in a third country), that should allow refugees to rebuild their life in 
dignity. See http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cf8.html. 
2
 M. Bradley and J. McAdam, 'Rethinking Durable Solutions to Displacement in the Context of Climate Change', 
Paper for the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement of 14 May 2012, available at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/05/14-displacement-bradley-mcadam, p. 2-3. 
3
 F. Gemenne, 'Climate-induced displacements in a 4°C+ world: scenarios and policy options', IDDRI Science Po, 
Presentation at the Nansen Conference, Oslo, 6 June 2011; F. Gemenne, 'Migration, Security and Human 
Development in the Face of Climate Change', IDDRI Sciences Po,  Presentation for the 'Jornada Vint Anys 
després Rio' in Barcelona, 29 February 2012. 
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1.1. Conceptualisation of ‘return migration’ 
 
Worldwide, many migrants cherish the hope to be able to return to their place of origin. In particular 
for those which were forced to leave their original habitat, a safe and dignified return is considered 
as a ‘durable solution’ and a way to relieve some of the harm imposed by the displacement4. But also 
in case legal procedures do not lead to a residence permit, there is often no other choice than to 
return to the country of origin. 
According to the IOM, return migration is a “relatively new area of migration”, without standard 
meaning in migration policy or law5. Obviously, a sustainable and consistent asylum and migration 
policy cannot go without a sustainable return policy. However, considering its complex and sensitive 
nature, return is an emotionally charged topic. Nonetheless, the past few years, return migration has 
come to the forefront. In particular assisted voluntary return (AVR) is increasingly recognised as a 
valuable alternative in the migration process, as it helps migrants to return to their home countries 
when they do not have the means to do so. AVR programmes represent a humane alternative to 
forced removals, and can even contribute to the socio-economic development of the regions of 
origin (see further below).  
Even though return migration can take different forms, the general migration debate uses a rather 
limited terminology, referring only to forced or voluntary return. This wrongly gives the impression 
that there are only two return modalities. Furthermore, the policy debate generally focuses on the 
return of irregular migrants, while it are often migrants with a legal residence status who choose to 
return to their country of origin. In that sense it is better only to speak of 'voluntary return' when the 
decision to return is taken by foreigners who have a right to stay in their country of destination (e.g. 
asylum seekers awaiting a decision on their asylum application, as well as migrants with a temporary 
or permanent residence permit). After all, a return is not "voluntary" if it is only a reaction to an 
order to leave the territory, in which case it is better to use the term “mandatory return”. Migrants 
who receive an order to leave the territory can do so independently, with their own means, or they 
can make use of organized, assisted return programmes. If they refuse to leave, they can be forcibly 
removed from the territory.   
In many countries, irregular migrants are encouraged to obey to a removal order, both through 
return and reintegration programmes, as well as by the prospect of a forced removal. Projects that 
                                                           
4
 Bradley and McAdam, supra note (2), p. 2. 
5
 Webpage of the International Organisation on Migration (IOM) on ‘return migration’, available at: 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/managing-migration/managing-migration-return-
migration/lang/en. 
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support the return of rejected asylum seekers or other irregular migrants undeniably have an added 
value compared to forced removals, both for the individual concerned and for the country of 
residence, but they should leave the discourse of "voluntariness"6.  
 Voluntary return Mandatory return 
Who? Migrants who legally reside in the 
country of destination 
Migrants who do not have the 
right to remain in the country of 
residence, thus being obliged to 
leave the territory.  
Return modalities → Independent return 
→ Assisted return 
→ Independent return 
→ Assisted return 
→ Forced return 
 
This figure reflects better how migrants perceive their return. When they leave their country of 
destination after a removal order, they do not sense their return as “voluntary”, as they only choose 
to return to avoid a forced removal or irregular stay. Voluntary return only exists when migrants 
makes an informed and conscious choice between returning to their country of origin or integrating 
in the country of stay. The "obedient" return of people who are not allowed to stay in their country 
of destination is not a voluntary return, but can be supported by assisted return and reintegration 
programmes, in order to help them to rebuild a dignified existence in their home country. 
 
1.2 The right to return and to leave in international law 
 
The right to freedom of movement, as incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
19487 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 19668, seems crucial for 
                                                           
6
 'Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration, Annual Report of Activities 2011', Report of the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2012, Geneva, available at: 
http://www.emnbelgium.be/sites/default/files/publications/avrr_report_2011_final.pdf", p. 21. 
7
 Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted through Resolution 217A of the UN General 
Assembly of 10 December 1948, declares that: 
 “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. 
 (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” 
8
 Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted in New York on 16 December 
1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976, UNTS 999, p. 171, holds that: 
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a discussion on return migration. According to Article 12 ICCPR, this right includes the right for any 
person to leave any country, as well as the right to enter, or to return to, his or her own country. The 
question now rises how we could guarantee these rights in a warmer world, where more and more 
regions of origin become uninhabitable. In other words, what are States’ obligations in relation to the 
right to leave, and the right to return? 
The right to enter one’s own country implies the right to remain in one’s own country, as well as the 
right to return to his own country9. As for the latter, this implies that States are obliged to take their 
citizens back in. However, it is generally accepted that the right to return entails only a passive duty 
for states to allow their citizens back in, and not the active duty, nor for the country or origin, nor for 
the country of stay, to facilitate or support the return for migrants who do not have their own means 
to do so. Moreover, it is not stipulated that the return must be a “sustainable” return, whereby the 
returnee has a perspective in his country of origin. However, a State may not hinder the return, for 
example by making it difficult or impossible to obtain the necessary travel documents. 
The counterpart of the right to return is the right to leave any country, including his own. This means 
that also the country of stay may not put obstacles in the way of migrants to leave the territory, and 
return to the country or origin10. Limitations concerning the transfer of social security rights are thus 
not only uninteresting from a policy point of view, but also questionable from a legal point of view, 
as they entail limitations to the right to return to his or her country of origin.  
Furthermore, the right to freedom of movement includes the right to leave his or her own country. 
However, there is no general right to asylum contained in human rights instruments. Whether or not 
forcibly displaced persons leaving their own country, can find asylum in another country, depends on 
the particular flight motive of the persons concerned, and of the specific asylum instruments which 
the State has ratified or put in place. The realisation of the right to leave seems thus hindered by 
current restrictive asylum and migration policies. Furthermore, as the adverse effects of climate 
change severely touch upon household’s resources, the most vulnerable people often do not have 
the means to leave their destructed environment. It could thus also be argued that the realisation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“(1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to 
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 
 (2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 
(3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are 
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health 
or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in 
the present Covenant. 
 (4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.” 
9
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27 on the Freedom of Movement (art. 12), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, adopted at the 1783rd meeting (sixty-seventh session), held on 18 October 1999, §19. 
10
 Ibid, §9. 
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the right to leave is increasingly “jeopardised” by environmental changes11. However, as the right to 
leave his own country does not imply an active duty for States, this right does not offer the necessary 
legal protection to forcibly displaced persons which are not able to return to their country of origin. 
In order to fill this protection gap, other civil and political human rights, including a non-refoulement 
obligation, might be more relevant (see further below in Chapter III). 
II. The right to return in relation to environment-related mobility 
 
Just as for any other category of international migrants or displaced persons, a return to the country 
of origin might be a desire for people which left their original habitat due to environmental 
disruptions. For regions which are not rendered uninhabitable, or where human life is (again) 
possible after a period of recovery or ecological restoration, we should therefore aim to facilitate a 
safe and durable return and reintegration in the community of origin12. 
 
2.1. Return migration as a development and adaptation strategy 
 
Obviously, return migration can only be successful when the returnee has sufficient perspectives in 
his country of origin. When for example large groups of refugees return to their region of origin after 
a conflict situation, their return has to be accompanied by measures supporting the recovery and 
reconciliation within the region. Measures that contribute to the reconstruction of the home region 
or the socio-economic development of the home community enlarge the sustainability of the return 
process13. The same is true for regions affected by severe sudden-onset natural disasters, where 
return programmes should contribute to the reconstruction of the affected area in order to be 
successful. Similarly, return migration could be opportune for communities affected by gradual 
environmental degradation, under the condition that the return process contributes for example to 
the socio-economic development of the home community. According to Afifi, return migration can 
even contribute to the ecological restoration of the region of origin. In Niger for example, severe 
environmental disruptions, caused inter alia by droughts, soil degradation, sand intrusion and the 
shrinking of Lake Chad, have an impact on migration at the national and international level.  Working 
                                                           
11
 Gemenne, supra note (3). 
12
 J. McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, 
p. 256. 
13
 European Commission, 'Green Paper on a Community Return Policy on Illegal Residents', Brussels, 10 April 
2002, COM(2002) 175 final, p. 23-24. 
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age males who used to migrate seasonally to coastal cities within the country, now tend to leave to 
further destinations in and outside the country, and migrate for longer periods, or even permanently. 
The women, children and elderly who stay behind, lack sufficient physical support to restore the 
environment. In 2006 the government therefore started a programme, offering financial support to 
encourage young men to return to their region of origin, and to take part in the ecological 
restoration of the environment. Indeed, the programme created about 35.000 temporary jobs, 
including the fixing of sand dunes, controlling tree chopping, digging half moons, and digging out 
sand from the river14. 
Returned migrants often have acquired new knowledge and skills in their former country of 
residence, allowing them to diversify their income upon return to their country of origin. However, 
although it is generally accepted that the reintegration of migrants has development benefits, the 
policy in many countries is not equipped to bring this knowledge, skills and/or financial means into 
action for the socio-economic development of the region of origin. Fortunately, there is now a 
tendency to actively link return policies to development needs in countries of origin15. More and 
more specific reintegration projects are created for small entrepreneurs, which could provide 
opportunities for employment in the region of origin. Various organisations provide assistance to 
returnees to concretize their business plans, and provide them with business trainings or financial 
assistance to realize their dreams as entrepreneurs (see further below). This way, assisted return 
offers a valuable and dignified perspective for the returnees future as well as for his community of 
origin. 
The last decennia brought about a myriad of initiatives supporting the return of migrants to their 
country of origin.  However, besides better guidance, assistance and supervision, it is also necessary 
to remove some of the obstacles that might hinder migrants to return to their country of origin. By 
facilitating circular migration between countries or origin and former countries of residence, for 
example through flexible access conditions or multiple entry visas, migrants could be encouraged to 
re-migrate to their country or origin. Furthermore, bilateral or multilateral agreements on the 
portability of social security rights could ensure that returnees do not lose their accrued rights16. 
                                                           
14
 T. Afifi, ‘Economic or Environmental Migration? The Push Factors in Niger’, in International Migration Vol. 49, 
Issue S1, June 2011, pp. e1-e249, Special Issue on Environmentally Induced Migration in the Context of Social 
Vulnerability, p. e95 - e124. 
15
 Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), 'Background Paper to Roundtable 2: Migrant 
integration, reintegration and circulation for development'  (Session 2.2.: Reintegration and circular migration - 
effective for development?), prepared by the Governments of Brazil and Portugal in collaboration with the RT 
team, the RT coordinator Dr. Irena Omelaniuk and the Task force set up by the Greek government for the 
preparation of the third meeting of the GFMD in Athens, 2009.  
16
 Ibid. 
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Moreover, it is important to provide rejected asylum seekers or other “unwanted” migrants with a 
longer period to fulfil a removal order, before a state can proceed to a forced removal. This way, 
migrants have a better chance to prepare their return properly, with or without the help of a support 
programme. Finally, international agreements could provide the necessary framework to support the 
link between return, reintegration, development and adaptation to changing environmental 
conditions. 
 
2.2. Assisted return as a modality for return migration 
 
2.3.1. In general 
 
Even though States are not obliged to assist migrants to return to their home country in a safe, 
dignified and durable manner, assisted return has gained significant weight in the general debate on 
return migration, both at the national, regional as well as the international policy level. Not only do 
assisted return programmes aid migrants to return to their countries of origin in a more humane and 
dignified manner than forced removals, they are also more cost-effective for the country of stay, 
they ensure that migrants have more time to prepare for their return, and allow migrants to return 
when they do not have their own means to do so17. 
 
In general, assisted return programmes provide administrative, logistical as well as financial support 
to migrants unable or unwilling to stay in the country of residence. They do not only facilitate the 
actual return of migrants, for example by making travel arrangements and facilitating the provision 
of travel documentation, but also aim to assist migrants to cope with the challenges they face prior 
to and after their return. Pre-return assistance can for example include the provision of information 
and advice to migrants on their available options, so as to help them to decide on whether or not 
they wish to return. Often, assisted return programmes focus particularly on vulnerable groups, such 
as migrants with health-related needs or other highly vulnerable migrants18. 
 
In order to guarantee a dignified and sustainable return, the reintegration of the returnees must also 
be supported. A returnee will indeed re-migrate if he sees no future in his country of origin. In order 
to help returnees to be reinserted into their communities of origin, the provision of reintegration 
                                                           
17
 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), supra note 6, p. 21. 
18
 Ibid, p. 17. 
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assistance has increasingly gained attention, and has now become an integral part of many assisted 
return programmes. Assistance is provided in the form of short- or longer-term accommodation after 
arrival in the region of origin, or medical support. Furthermore, the sustainability of the return 
process becomes more important in policy formulation, acknowledging the fact that the root causes 
of migration must be addressed in order for the return to be durable and sustainable19. Among other 
things, it is for example crucial to provide the necessary tools for migrants to be self-sufficient upon 
return to their country of origin. Reintegration assistance can thus include assistance with job 
placement, the set-up of small businesses, education and training20. 
 
Reintegration assistance not only benefits the individual returnee, but can also enhance the socio-
economic development of the wider community of origin. In order to guarantee a greater 
sustainability of an individual’s return, it is important to address the socio-economic needs of the 
community or origin, thereby addressing the root causes of the original migration. Moreover, 
reintegration assistance could prevent potential disadvantages of the return process for the 
community of origin, such as the shortage of labour or the loss of remittances21. Return and 
reintegration assistance might thus have a triple-win effect, benefiting the migrants themselves as 
well as the country of residence and the community of origin. 
 
2.3.2. Assisted return migration for environmentally-induced migrants? 
 
The question now rises whether assisted return and reintegration programmes could also benefit the 
sustainable return of migrants who left their region of origin due to environmental disruptions. As 
discussed above, all migrants have a right to return to their country of origin. However, in reality, 
even if people are allowed to return to their region of origin after an environmental disaster has 
occurred, their return can only be safe and durable if the physical, social and economic recovery of 
the affected area is rapid and effective. In the immediate aftermath of sudden-onset natural 
disasters, for example the diversification of livelihood provision and the reconstruction of 
infrastructure are crucial factors for the sustainability of a return, whether it is mandatory or 
voluntary22. 
                                                           
19
 Ibid, p. 25. 
20
 Ibid, p. 20-24. 
21
 Ibid, p. 19, 25. 
22
 K. F. Warner, 'Assessing Institutional and Governance Needs Related to Environmental Change and Human 
Migration', The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Study Team on Climate-Induced Migration, June 
2010,  p. 3. 
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As discussed above, assisted return and reintegration programmes could render the return process 
more humane, dignified and sustainable. As for environmentally-induced migration, they could make 
financial means available for recovery and rehabilitation in a post-disaster phase. Furthermore, 
return assistance could help environmentally-vulnerable communities to adapt to a changing 
environment, for example by helping returnees to diversify their income. In addition, it is important 
not only to address the socio-economic root causes of migration, but also the potential 
environmental push factors, through mitigation and adaptation assistance. In order to decrease a 
community’s vulnerability to recurring natural disasters, return assistance could also be directed 
towards resilience building and disaster risk reduction. Finally, as return migration could even 
contribute to the ecological restoration of certain regions of origin, assistance could be directed 
towards the creation of jobs in ecological restoration. 
As the number of environmental disasters, and thus the number of environmentally displaced 
persons, is expected to increase in the future, humanitarian organisations assisting in the return 
process could face a capacity challenge in the future. It is therefore important that they start 
preparing now, if they want to be able to assist many more millions of displaced persons in returning 
to their region of origin in a safe and durable manner. In 2011, the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), which is mandated by its Constitution to ensure orderly migration, inter alia, 
through voluntary return and reintegration assistance, has, with the help of its partners, provided 
55.124 migrants with return assistance, in 166 countries of origin. About half of these migrants also 
received reintegration assistance to help them to reintegrate in their communities or origin23. Given 
the organisation’s crucial position regarding assisted return and its interest in the environmental 
migration debate, the IOM seems to be in an ideal position to start up the dialogue on assisted 
return towards regions affected by environmental degradation, taking the adaptation challenges and 
needs for ecological restoration into account. In light of this process, it can be recommended to 
install pilot projects for the assisted return of environmentally-induced migrants. As such projects 
with an environmental aspect are currently not (yet) in place, lessons can be learned from good 
practices of other IOM-supported return projects, assisting displaced persons to return to conflict-
affected areas, and supporting them in the reconstruction of the affected regions. 
However, the lack of recognition of environmental push factors as a legitimate cause of migration 
might hinder such effective policy responses24. It should therefore also be recommended to firstly fill 
the normative gap which exists for people forcibly displaced due to environmental disruptions, 
thereby recognising environmentally-induced migration as a legal concept. After all, if disaster 
                                                           
23
 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), supra note (6), p. 13-15, p. 23. 
24
 Warner, supra note (22), p. 2. 
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responses are too slow and ineffective, or adaptation challenges are not met, migrants will not be 
able to return to their region of origin in a safe and durable manner. To some regions of origin, a 
return will even be physically impossible, such as for the population of some small island States in the 
Pacific Ocean25. Yet as there are currently no international legal frameworks in place to protect 
environmentally-displaced persons in the country of stay, the next Chapter will discuss what happens 
when a returning to a destructed environment becomes a duty rather than a choice. 
 
III. The duty to return to a destructed environment: revisiting the non-
refoulement principle 
 
The previous chapter has attempted to describe how a sustainable and durable return to the country 
of origin could be facilitated for environment-induced migrants. However, when those migrants 
cannot return to their region of origin that will no longer support their survival, the question rises 
under which circumstances a country of stay can force migrants to return. This Chapter attempts to 
answer this question by analysing human rights-based non-refoulement obligations in the context of 
deteriorating living conditions, based on case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Justice. 
As for people displaced due to a slow-onset deteriorating environment or sudden natural disasters, 
the lack of protection mechanisms at the international and regional level has been widely 
discussed26. The International Refugee Convention of 195127 does not apply to environmentally-
displaced persons, and nor do regional protection instruments such as the European Qualification 
Directive28 (see further below). Therefore, several authors have adopted a more human rights-based 
                                                           
25
 Bradley and McAdam, supra note (2), p. 2. 
26 
See for example J. McAdam, ‘Climate Change Displacement and International Law: Complementary 
Protection Standards’, Paper prepared for the UNHCR’s Expert Roundtable on Climate Change and 
Displacement convened from 22 to 25 February 2011 in Bellagio, Italy, Legal and Protection Policy Research 
Series, UNHCR, Division of International Protection, May 2011; A. Lopez, 'The Protection of Environmentally-
Displaced Persons in International Law', Envtl. L. 37, 2007; F. Biermann and I. Boas, 'Preparing for a Warmer 
World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees', Global Environmental Politics 10, 
no. 1, 2010; V. Kolmannskog and F. Myrstad, 'Environmental Displacement in European Asylum Law', European 
Journal of Migration and Law 11, 2009.  
27
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28 July 1951, entered into force on 27 April 1954, 
189 UNTS 137. 
28
 Council Directive 2004/38 of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection 
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approach, discussing whether environmentally-displaced persons could be protected against a forced 
return or ‘refoulement’ through general human rights law. After all, the non-refoulement principle is 
not only one of the greatest benefits of the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is also a cornerstone of 
human rights law, where it acts as a general ban on returning persons to places where they risk 
certain human rights violations. The principle has found expression in, inter alia, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)29 and the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)30. 
This Chapter summarizes the general findings on the applicability of the non-refoulement principle to 
environmental displacement, before it analyses more specifically States’ non-refoulement obligations 
in relation to deteriorating socio-economic living conditions. 
 
3.1. Non-refoulement obligations towards environmentally-displaced persons? 
3.1.1. In general 
 
Except from the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Convention against Torture31, international 
human rights instruments do not explicitly contain non-refoulement obligations, but instead contain 
implied obligations not to return a person to countries where certain primary human rights are 
violated32. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the prohibition on torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment of Article 3 ECHR implies a duty not to return a person to a place 
where he risks being subjected to the prohibited treatment. According to the Court in the Soering-
case, 
“the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue under Article 3 (art. 
3), and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds 
have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and the content of the protection granted, L 304/12, Official Journal of 30.9.2004 (hereafter: Qualification 
Directive). 
29
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted in New York on 16 December 1966, entered into 
force on 23 March 1976, UNTS 999, p. 171. 
30
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in Rome on 4 
November 1950, Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 5. 
31
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by 
General Assembly Resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, entered into force on 26 June 1987, 1465 UNTS 85, 
113. 
32
 M. Foster, 'Non-Refoulement on the basis of Socio-Economic Deprivation: The Scope of Complementary 
Protection in International Human Rights Law', New Zealand Law Review PART II, 2009, p. 265. 
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subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting 
country.”
33
  
This view was consistently confirmed in a number of other cases, where the Court ruled that the 
reasoning of the Soering-case applies to the expulsion of rejected asylum seekers34. Clearly, the non-
refoulement principle is a fundamental component of the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. In this context, the principle is generally even considered to be 
part of customary international law35.  
The existence of such implicit non-refoulement obligations has been generally accepted in relation to 
the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the right to 
life36. For other human rights, there is disagreement about the existence of a non-refoulement 
component. Treaty bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee have declared that the scope of 
the non-refoulement principle is not confined to the right to life and the right not to be subjected to 
torture, and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment37. Likewise, the European Court of Human 
Rights has in various cases ruled that non-refoulement protection might in the future be extended to 
other human rights than Article 3 ECHR38. In theory, non-refoulement protection would thus be 
possible for all human rights violations, but in practice, non-refoulement protection is generally only 
established for absolute rights, such as the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment39. As explained by the European Court in the case Z and T v. United Kingdom, the 
fundamental importance of the rights involved, their absolute or non-derogable nature as well as the 
fact that the obligations are “internationally accepted”, determines to what extent the non-
refoulement doctrine could be extended to other human rights40.  
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It has been widely discussed whether or not people displaced due to severe environmental 
conditions in their country of origin can rely on non-refoulement protection in a country of stay. 
There is no doubt that, in certain cases of severe environmental disasters, people can not (yet) 
rebuild their lives in their region of origin. The most infamous example are the “sinking” island States 
in the Pacific Ocean. However, also in case of sudden-onset natural disasters, a temporary ban on 
forced removals to the destructed region of origin would be advisable. However, whether or not 
States have a legal non-refoulement obligation in such cases, depends on the interpretation of the 
human rights-based non-refoulement principle, subjected for a large part to the assessment made by 
international and regional human rights courts. 
Up till now, the European Court of Human Rights has not explicitly dealt with environment-induced 
displacement. Nonetheless, lessons can be learned from the Court’s progressive interpretation of the 
notion of ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ of Article 3 ECHR41. Various authors have argued that 
sending environmentally-displaced persons back to a region where they can no longer survive, 
amounts to an inhuman or degrading treatment. It is up to the Court to decide whether such a 
progressive development of Article 3 is acceptable. For the case of environmentally-displaced 
persons, it is for example interesting to explore whether deteriorating socio-economic living 
conditions could trigger a right to non-refoulement protection, as they often suffer from famine, a 
lack of medical treatment or education, or other forms of socio-economic deprivations.  
 
3.1.2. Relevance of socio-economic living conditions in the country of origin 
 
In considering whether the non-refoulement doctrine can also apply to a deprivation of socio-
economic rights, our attention is obviously first turned to international instruments protecting socio-
economic rights, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)42. However, as up to this moment, it is not generally accepted to attach non-refoulement 
obligations directly to socio-economic rights, the ICESCR is not (yet) relevant for the present 
purpose43. Since violations of socio-economic human rights in the country of origin do not lead to a 
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direct non-refoulement protection, it has often been attempted to re-characterize them as violations 
of civil and political human rights44.  
The idea that civil and political rights can be interpreted as incorporating obligations of a socio-
economic nature is increasingly gaining attention, and has even been recognised by various treaty 
bodies and regional human rights courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights45. Both the 
right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
have been recognised as extending to socio-economic deprivation under certain circumstances. 
Homelessness might for example engage the right to privacy or the right to life46, while poor 
detention conditions have been characterised as inhuman or degrading treatment47. The question 
then rises whether this interpretation also applies to the removal context.  Even though treaty bodies 
as well as human rights courts have attempted to define the scope of implied non-refoulement 
obligations, there still remains uncertainty as to its exact limitations.  
 
A. Socio-economic living conditions and the notion of inhuman and degrading treatment 
 
In assessing whether sending a person back to a degraded or destructed environment is prohibited, 
the scope of the notion of ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ has been widely discussed. According to 
the European Court of Human Rights, Article 3 ECHR can be applied in new contexts which might 
arise in the future, irrespective of the responsibility of the public authorities48. According to Antonio 
Cassese, Article 3 ECHR, which is grounded in the concept of human dignity, must be interpreted 
broadly, not limited to physical or psychological mistreatment in the civil rights area, and is therefore 
suitable to protect economic and social rights, be it only in extreme cases49. However, it is up to the 
Court to decide how progressively it wants to develop Article 3 ECHR. 
Already in 1990, the European Court of Human Rights (then the European Commission of Human 
Rights) was asked to rule on whether the notion of ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ could be 
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applied to socio-economic conditions50. Francine Van Volsem, a Belgian single mother with 2 
children, was unable to hold a stable job due to severe health issues. She relied for her living on the 
alimony paid by her ex-husband, as well as on social security provided by a Belgian social welfare 
centre. As the heating in her small apartment ran on electricity, she was unable to pay the 
disproportionally high electricity bill. In December 1983, the electricity company therefore cut off her 
electricity51. In her application to the European Commission of Human Rights, Mrs. Van Volsem 
argued i.a. that the cutting of her electricity in a cold winter period amounted to inhuman and 
degrading treatment as prohibited by Article 3 ECHR. Although the case was held inadmissible, the 
Commission, ruling by a Committee of three, did not rule out the possibility to apply Article 3 to 
situations where social and economic conditions are so humiliating so as to amount to inhuman 
treatment52. 
However, this decision concerns socio-economic treatment by a State actor, instead of socio-
economic conditions prevailing in a certain country. It seems therefore difficult to extend the 
Committee’s reasoning to environmental conditions. Furthermore, the Committee did not clarify 
under which circumstances a person’s daily living conditions, more in particular the lack of public 
social services, turns into inhuman or degrading treatment53. It also remains unclear whether the 
Committee took the specific circumstances of the case, such as Mrs. Van Volsem’s health conditions 
and the fact that electricity was cut off in the coldest period of the winter, into account. It is 
therefore regrettable that the Committee of three did not refer this case to the plenary Commission, 
to provide greater clarity on these issues. 
Later, the question whether a violation of social and economic rights could amount to inhuman or 
degrading treatment also came up in non-refoulement cases. However, most cases concerned  a lack 
of medical treatment in the country of origin. In the case D. v. United Kingdom of 1997, the Court 
found that returning a HIV-infected person would amount to ‘inhuman treatment’, due to a lack of 
sufficient medical treatment, social network, a home or any prospect of income in the country or 
origin54. The Court came to this conclusion as the forced return would hasten the death of the 
individual concerned, and “subject him to acute mental and physical suffering”55. In light of these 
exceptional circumstances, and “bearing in mind the critical stage now reached in the applicant’s 
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fatal illness”56, the Court found that the return would amount to a violation of Article 3 ECHR by the 
United Kingdom. This ruling is remarkable, as the source of the ill-treatment in this particular case 
lies not with the public authorities of the country of origin57. Furthermore, besides a lack of medical 
treatment, the Court also referred to the general situation of poverty in the country of origin58, thus 
confirming that the notion of ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’, in the removal context, extends to 
deprivations of socio-economic rights other than a lack of medical treatment59. 
Severe environmental disruptions, caused by natural disasters or climate change, could lead to 
similar circumstances, when vital infrastructure is destroyed and provision of basic services such as 
clean water, food and electricity is hindered60. It remains to be seen however whether the European 
Court of Human Rights would apply the non-refoulement principle contained in Article 3 ECHR in 
such situations. After all, the Court emphasized in subsequent cases that its ruling in D. v. United 
Kingdom is only valid in “extreme circumstances”61. In N. v. United Kingdom for example,  the Court 
distinguished the circumstances of the case from the “very exceptional case” of D. v. United 
Kingdom, “where the humanitarian grounds against the removal [were] compelling”62, and found the 
case inadmissible, as the applicant was “not at present time critically ill”63. By emphasizing the 
exceptional character of the D. v. United Kingdom ruling, the Court has thus “limited any potential for 
an expansive approach to medical care cases in the future”64. It is clear that the ill-treatment needs 
to attain “a minimum level of severity”, depending i.a. on the duration of the treatment and the sex, 
age and health of the person concerned, so as to fall within the scope of Article 3 ECHR65.  
While the European Court of Human Rights did not apply this founding in removal cases relating to 
violations of socio-economic rights other than medical cases, Article 3 ECHR has been applied to 
other socio-economic contexts in “domestic cases”66. Based on a considerable body of international, 
regional and national jurisprudence, Michelle Foster argues that the same analysis can be applied to 
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refoulement cases outside the medical context, and is not restricted to cases where the socio-
economic deprivation is caused by intentional action of State actors67. 
Support for this viewpoint can also be found in the latest landmark ruling of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the case M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece of January 201168. The case concerned an 
Afghan asylum seeker who, having transited through Greece, sought asylum in Belgium. After he was 
transferred back to Greece in application of the European Dublin regulation, he was placed in a 
detention centre in a reduced space, with little access to food and sanitary facilities, in poor hygienic 
conditions, without ventilation and a proper place to sleep69. After he was released from the centre, 
M.S.S., having no means of subsistence, lived in a park in Athens in complete destitution70. These 
degrading detention and living conditions led the Court to condemn Greece for a violation of Article 3 
ECHR, attaching substantial weight to the specific situation of M.S.S.as an asylum seeker71. According 
to the Court, asylum seekers should be regarded as “particularly vulnerable”, due to the traumatic 
experiences they might have endured72. In light of this particular vulnerability, the socio-economic 
deprivation in casu attained the level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 ECHR. 
Applying the non-refoulement principle to this decision, Belgium was also condemned, not only for 
the possible ‘indirect’ refoulement of the applicant to Afghanistan through Greece, but also for the 
‘direct’ refoulement to Greece73. Based on the available information, Belgium should have decided 
that the applicant faced a real and individual risk in Greece to be treated in violation of Article 3 
ECHR74. This decision is important, as it confirms that inhuman and degrading living conditions must 
be considered when applying Article 3 ECHR in expulsion cases, taking the particular vulnerable 
situation of the applicant into account. 
It remains to be seen whether the European Court of Human Rights will take this line of reasoning 
further, and apply it when severe environmental disruptions lie at the basis of inhuman and 
degrading (socio-economic) living conditions. Much depends on Court’s interpretation of 
“exceptional circumstances” as in D. v. United Kingdom, and the “particular vulnerable” situation of 
the persons concerned as in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. It is questionable whether the Court will 
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consider general situations of poverty or a lack of resources for a whole affected community. So 
while it is, in theory, possible to re-characterize environmental harm as inhuman or degrading 
treatment, this idea needs to be much further developed by international bodies and regional human 
rights courts, before it will ever be applied in practice by States75. 
 
B. Socio-economic living conditions and the right to life 
 
As mentioned above, the European Court of Human Rights has, up till now, only attached a non-
refoulement obligation to the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment (Article 3 ECHR), and not (yet) to the right to life (Article 2 ECHR). However, the Court 
clearly left this possibility open for the future. Furthermore, it has been recognised in other fora that 
the right to life, as for example contained in Article 6 of the ICCPR, contains the right of every person 
not to be sent back to regions where he or she faces a real risk of being subjected to a violation of 
the right to life76. In examining whether or not a violation of socio-economic rights could lead to non-
refoulement protection, the right to life thus offers another pathway. After all, the right to life is 
closely connected to other, socio-economic, human rights, such as the right to an adequate standard 
of living (including the right to food, housing,…), and the right not to be deprived of a means of 
subsistence. The European Court of Human Rights has for example declared that “an issue may arise 
under Art 2 […] where it is shown that the authorities of a Contracting State put an individual’s life at 
risk through the denial of health care which they have undertaken to make available to the 
population generally”77. 
In addition, unlike article 3 ECHR, Article 2 ECHR has been applied in relation to environmental 
disruptions, be in not in removal cases. According to the European Court of Human Rights, the right 
to life includes the obligation for States “to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those 
within its jurisdiction”, including protection from environmental harm, for example caused by an 
industrial accident at a waste-collection site78. In 2008, the judgment of the Court in the Budayeva-
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case decided on a violation of the right to life on account of the State’s failure to act adequately in 
preventing a mudslide79. 
Although there is, at this moment, no non-refoulement obligation attached to Article 2 ECHR, State 
practice and jurisprudence could develop in this direction in the future. After all, just as the right not 
to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the right to life provides a 
basis for granting subsidiary protection in Article 15 of the Qualification Directive (see further below). 
The right to life thus deserves further attention in the future as a possible way to grant non-
refoulement protection to environmentally-displaced persons. 
 
3.2. Extended interpretation of European asylum law? 
 
In light of the search for legal solutions to fill the normative gap for environmentally-displaced 
persons, the human rights-based concept of non-refoulement protection provides an interesting 
starting point. However, it is important to keep in mind that the non-refoulement prohibition does 
not oblige States to grant a residence status to protected persons80. 
In 2004, the European Union therefore adopted the Qualification Directive, with the aim of granting 
a legal complementary  protection status to the many displaced persons within its territory which do 
not fit within the 1951 Refugee Convention, but are nonetheless in need of international protection. 
The Directive confirms the commitment of the EU Member States to the principle of non-
refoulement “in accordance with their international obligations”81. While such protection used to be 
considered as a matter of charity, the Directive now grants subsidiary protection to persons not 
qualifying for refugee status if 
“substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or 
her country of origin […] would face a real risk of suffering from serious harm as defined in Article 15 
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[…] and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that 
country”
82
. 
In recent years, many authors have discussed whether subsidiary protection could be granted to 
environmentally-displaced persons. As the Directive exhaustively enumerates three types of “serious 
harm”, thus triggering a protection status83, persons fleeing a destructed environment do not qualify 
for subsidiary protection. 
 
However, various authors have argued that Article 15(b), granting protection in case of ‘inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’, could open some room for a larger interpretation84. Based on 
the above described case law of the European Court of Human Rights, some have proposed to 
interpret the notion of “inhuman or degrading treatment” so as to include the forced return of 
environmentally-displaced persons to regions which can no longer sustain human life85.  
 
However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has also discussed whether severe socio-economic 
living conditions should be taken into account in the assessment of claims for a protection status 
under the Qualification Directive. In the case Salahadin Abdulla and Others v. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland of March 201086, the ECJ was asked in a preliminary ruling whether the cessation of 
refugee status under Article 11(e) also requires that the general living conditions in the country of 
origin ensure a minimum standard of living. While the Court left this question unanswered, the 
Advocate General Mazak held that the availability of a minimum standard of living in the country of 
origin is not “an independent relevant criterion when assessing cessation”, but that they “must 
however be taken into consideration as part of the assessment of whether the change in 
circumstances there can be considered significant and non-temporary in nature in accordance with 
Article 11(2)”87. 
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Although the Court remained silent on this issue, the Advocate General thus seems to suggest that 
socio-economic living conditions may be considered when ruling on the effectiveness of the available 
protection. Nonetheless, the ECJ seems, at this moment, not to support the idea that deteriorating 
socio-economic living conditions can be part of a wide interpretation of the notion of ‘inhuman or 
degrading treatment’, thereby granting access to subsidiary protection to persons fleeing a situation 
of socio-economic destitution. 
However, whether or not such a broad interpretation of this eligibility criterion will be accepted in 
the future, not only depends on the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), but also on the 
European Court of Human Rights, as Article 15 (b) is based on Article 3 ECHR88. It is generally 
accepted that human rights provisions could help to clarify the scope of Article 15 of the Qualification 
Directive. In a judgment of 17 February 2009, the ECJ has explicitly referred to Article 3 ECHR for the 
interpretation of ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ in Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive89. 
Based on the above described evolution within the case law on Article 3 ECHR, it could thus be 
argued that the Qualification Directive might provide the necessary protection to environmentally-
displaced persons in the distant future. In particular the ruling of the ECtHR in the case M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece, which came later than the ECJ ruling in Salahadin Abdulla, might act as a 
catalyst in European case law on asylum. If the ECJ wants to keep its jurisprudence in line with that of 
the ECtHR, it will have to adapt its line of reasoning in Salahadin Abdulla, and accept that inhuman 
and degrading living conditions may trigger a right to subsidiary protection. 
 
For the case of environmentally-displaced persons, it is however important to keep the limits of what 
can be achieved within the existing legal framework of the European Union in mind. At this moment, 
Article 2 nor Article 3 ECHR have been applied by the ECtHR in removal cases concerning 
environmentally-induced migration, and it is clear that the ECJ will not take this step before the 
ECtHR does. A wide interpretation of the Qualification Directive so as to include environmentally-
displaced persons was clearly not the intention of the drafters, and is currently not widely accepted. 
Besides, due to requirements concerning the “actors of serious harm”90 and the “internal flight 
alternative”91, the Qualification Directive might only be of interest to a limited number of 
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environmentally-displaced persons92. While the principle of non-refoulement in relation to socio-
economic living conditions could, in theory, act as a possible basis for the elaboration of a regional 
asylum regime for environmentally-displaced persons, in practice, such a development currently still 
seems an unattainable ideal. 
Concluding remarks on the way forward 
 
This paper has attempted to initiate the discussion on return migration in relation to environmental 
push factors of international migration. It argues that our migration policy should not only address 
the needs of those displaced persons which are not able to return to their country of origin, but also 
of those willing to, or being obliged to, return to an environment which is suffering from 
environmental degradation or recovering from a natural disaster. We need to support policies that 
allow, or even assist, people to return when they want to, ánd at the same time advocate for the 
necessary legal frameworks that allow people to stay in their country of destination, when they 
cannot return to their destructed environment.  
For many migrants, a return to the country of origin remains an unattainable ideal, which is often 
difficult to achieve due to a lack of sufficient resources or a lack of sustainable perspectives in the 
region of origin. By facilitating the safe and dignified return of environment-induced migrants and 
encouraging their sustainable reintegration in their region of origin, we are one step closer to a 
comprehensive, effective, sustainable and mutually beneficial approach to return migration. And if 
we want to address the root causes of migration in the process of return migration, we must not 
ignore environmental push factors. Assisted return and reintegration projects should for example 
address adaptation needs in the region of origin, or direct assistance towards resilience building and 
disaster risk reduction. 
Yet we do have to recognise that some environmentally-displaced persons will not be able to return 
to their destructed region of origin. Nonetheless, a new international protection regime, based on a 
wide interpretation of the human rights-based non-refoulement obligation, seems currently further 
away than ever. However, in practice, considerations based on this principle of non-refoulement 
have been applied in case of natural disasters. For example, in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami, 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) called for the suspension 
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of returns to the affected regions, which was widely respected93. Furthermore, case law on non-
refoulement protection in relation to socio-economic rights seems to develop slowly in the direction 
of protection against inhuman and degrading living conditions. So in theory, this interpretation could 
act as a new ground for the elaboration of a protection regime for environmentally-displaced 
persons.  
However, as States tend to be more willing to accept persons on the basis of ad hoc humanitarian 
schemes or decisions, instead of relying on a human rights-based legal protection regime94, several 
authors now suggest to create a soft law instrument concerning environment-induced migration, to 
guide national and international policies on the topic95. Since several recent developments show an 
increased awareness to the problem of environmental migration and displacement, the possibility, 
practical feasibility and added value of such an instrument is certainly worth further discussion. And 
in order for such a soft law instrument to offer a comprehensive and sustainable solution, it would 
have to include provisions on various return modalities in relation to environment-induced 
migration. 
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